The Labor Dimension of the Emerging Free Trade Area of the Americas
The purpose of these lectures is to explore a labor dimension for the FTAA. This study is divided into four parts: Part 1 provides context by reviewing the history of Inter-American economic cooperation, especially on labor and trade. Part 2 examines how labor has been addressed in the major free trade agreements of the Americas. Part 3 looks at the normative basis for international labor cooperation. Part 4 makes specific recommendations for addressing labor issues in the FTAA.
Historical Context
The significance of labor as an FTAA issue cannot be understood by looking only at the FTAA negotiations that commenced in April 1998. Although the official FTAA website traces the FTAA's 'antecedents' as far back as the 1st Summit of the Americas held in December 1994 3 , the story actually begins 170 years earlier -when Simon Bolívar inspired the first assembly of the *George Washington University Law School, June 2004. This is the draft version of the paper that will appear in Philip Alston, ed., Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford, 2005) .
further agreed that international questions relating to social problems should be included on the program of all future conferences. Although there is some overlap between children's rights and labor rights, the two fields are distinguishable. The Pan American cooperation on children is noted here because it has been more active than the labor cooperation. One reason might be is that although the multilateral ILO existed for labor issues, children's issues lacked global institutions and therefore bloomed better at the 10 The International Conferences of American States, supra note 6, at 260-266.
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Manley O. Hudson (ed), International Legislation, Vol. II, at 901 et seq.
12
Seventh International Conference of American States, 'Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Committees' (1933) , at 59-60. regional level. The same point can be made about the Inter-American Commission on Women, founded in 1928, which preceded and inspired later developments at the global level. 13 The Sixth Pan American (Havana) Conference of 1928 approved a resolution on Emigration and Immigration which called for the principle of equality of civil rights as between nationals and foreigners.
14 The entire immigration issue proved controversial, however, as states jealously guarded their autonomy. For example, the United States insisted that 'the control of immigration is a matter of purely domestic concern....' 15 Yet some states saw a common interest in more open borders. For instance, El Salvador proposed no state not place obstacles to emigration and immigration among American states.
In 1933, the Seventh Pan American (Montevideo) Conference approved several labor-related resolutions. For example, the Conference called on governments to facilitate freedom of association, to adopt the principle of 'family income' in order to increase 'human capital,' and to establish a register of immigration possibilities in each country. 16 Another resolution called for a 'Campaign Against Unemployment,' including measures to facilitate local, national, and international commerce.
The Conference also sought the establishment of an Inter-American Labor Institute with a mandate to develop recommendations and principles for the solution of American social problems which were thought to have features 'distinctive from, if not in conflict with European problems' being dealt with by the ILO. 17 Among the valuable principles slated for discussion was 'that the machine must be 13 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order (Yale 1980) , at 644-645. 14 The International Conferences of American States, supra note 6, at 378-381. 15 Id. at 380. 16 The International Conferences of American States. First Supplement 1933 -1940 (Carnegie Endowment, 1940 , at 92-93, 238-240, 270. 17 The International Conferences, First Supplement, supra note 16, at 39-41. containing 10 guiding principles. The first principle was for governments to direct economic policies toward the creation of conditions which will encourage, through expanding domestic and foreign trade and investment, the attainment everywhere of high levels of real income, employment and consumption, free from excessive fluctuations, in order that their peoples may be adequately fed, housed, and
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Final Act of the Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, January 1942 , 36 AJIL Supp. 61, at 64 (1942 .
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'Preliminary Recommendations on Postwar Problems, ' International Conciliation, No. 387, February 1943, 101, at 125. 20 Id.
clothed, have access to services necessary for health, education, and well-being, and enjoy the rewards of their labor in dignity and in freedom.
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The Conference also approved a 'Declaration of the Social Principles of America' which called on every country in the region to adopt social legislation on a scale not lower than that indicated in ILO conventions, including the recognition of the right of workers to organize, bargain collectively, and to strike. 22 This Declaration was premised on the axiom that 'man must be the center of interest of all efforts of peoples and governments,' a thought that returned like a comet 50 years later at the United Compare: 'To this end, we will create a framework for action to: (a) Place people at the centre of development and direct our economies to meet human needs more effectively;...' World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, 12 March 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF.166/9, para. 26(a).
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Inman, supra note 4, at 212. The nongovernmental advisors also sought to influence the negotiations on trade. For example, the U.S. government's proposal for reciprocal tariff reductions was opposed by the Mexican trade unions who argued that the United States had relied upon tariffs to protect domestic industries during its own industrial development. Id. at 215.
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Several years ago, Brazil sought a role for labor representatives in national delegations to the FTAA talks, but gave up after opposition by the Clinton Administration and other governments. Kevin G. The experience so far is summarized in Table 1 left to right. One conclusion that can be drawn from Table 1 is that there is no optimal treatment of labor in the sense of an agreement that is more progressive than the others in every way. The purely American agreements do more on transparency and access to courts, while the agreement with the European Community is more attentive to public participation and discourse. The only agreement to create an international commission to promote cooperation is the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) in 1993. The other agreements promote cooperation through meetings of national officials.
As Table 1 shows, none of the provisions on labor is subject to adjudication except for the obligation that governments avoid a trade-related persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce national labor law. The obligation to enforce national labor law is supervised through state-to-state dispute settlement rather than by giving victims a right of action. If a complaining government lodges a dispute and wins, the scofflaw government would be expected to improve its national enforcement and if it does not, a monetary assessment can be imposed. Two of the agreements provide for a trade sanction -a withdrawal of trade agreement benefits -to promote compliance.
A requirement to enforce national law is a puzzling objective in an international agreement.
The traditional approach in conventional international law is to promote a convergence and uplifting of national law. Certainly, that is the stance taken by the ILO since 1919. glass houses with regard to labor rights, and so would be uninterested in throwing stones at the others. For that reason, the three governments are also uninterested in amending the side agreement to allow individuals to lodge complaints to an international tribunal.
The side agreement does allow individuals to send communications about national enforcement problems, and 28 have been sent. 54 Little has happened as a result, however, except for some joint statements and remedial seminars. Of course, the fact that the enforcement provisions have proved a nullity does not mean that the side agreement is unsuccessful. Overall, the experiment has proved useful in creating an international commission to promote North American labor cooperation.
Unfortunately, that institutional centerpiece was omitted from the U.S. right of action to an international tribunal, however, no labor policy purpose is served by the current FTA approach of committing governments to enforce their own idiosyncratic labor laws. The only purpose being served by these labor provisions is to satisfy the political need of appearing to use the FTA to safeguard worker rights.
That an international commitment to enforce one's own domestic law makes little sense does not necessarily justify the alternative approach of including within an FTA an obligation to follow international labor standards. On the contrary, it would seem that if Countries A, B, C, etc. have an interest in upwardly harmonizing their labor policies, that goal might be better accomplished through a labor rather than a trade agreement. As Table 1 shows, some of the earlier Inter-American FTAs took the approach of having a separate labor agreement, but that configuration has now been abandoned (at least by the United States) in an effort to give trade agreements a holistic veneer.
What seems to be driving the current U.S. effort to incorporate labor provisions into FTAs is not to achieve benefits of labor cooperation, but rather to show that trade concessions will be withdrawable should the labor commitment be violated. That logic relates to political coalition building more than to economic coherence. Part 3 of this study will discuss the economic coherence of sole labor and trade-related labor cooperation, as well as the political foundations for intergovernmental labor cooperation.
Before moving to Part 3, this lecture will address one other matter, which is the tension between regional and multilateral initiative. If countries in the Americas want to foster worker rights and improve labor standards, then why not just do that through the ILO? 65 The answer is that international labor cooperation can be pursued on a dual track -globally at the ILO and regionally in various fora. The periodic ILO regional conferences are aimed at capacity building and strengthening of the multilateral system; they do not seek separate labor conventions.
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The orientation is different in the trade arena where regional efforts sometimes take the shape of preferential trade agreements. These are discriminatory regimes that may or may not be supportive of the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO). 67 In general, a regional trade agreement can never rank higher than second best to a multilateral agreement. 68 The nature of trade and the need for cooperation is exactly the same in one region as in another.
By contrast, the rationale for a regional labor agreement can be stronger than for a regional trade agreement if a regional labor market exists or if a region has a distinctive pattern of industrial relations. In such instances, there may be a need for a discrete policy in one region that would not be appropriate in another region, or globally. More likely, however, the justification for including labor rules in a regional FTA will be to achieve a more balanced agreement. According to the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, '...if regional integration is to be a stepping stone towards a fairer globalization, a strong social dimension is required.' 
Normative Basis for International Labor Cooperation
Part 3 discusses the conceptual underpinning of a labor dimension to the FTAA. Because labor law is so contested, this case will be constructed from the bottom up. For a different perspective, see Sir James Goldsmith, The Trap (Carroll & Graf, 1993) , at 43 (stating that 'We must start by rejecting the concept of global free trade and we must replace it by regional free trade.'). for national labor law. Second, I explain the need for international labor law. Third, I consider whether labor objectives should be sought in a trade versus a labor agreement.
A. Why National Labor Law?
National labor law is aimed at achieving three distinct objectives -correcting market failure, protecting against government abuse, and enhancing equity. These concerns exist at the national level, and would underlie labor law even in an imaginary world where countries shun transborder economic intercourse. 70 In the simplest vertical model, the government regulates the private actors.
In a vertical federal model, there are also allocations of authority between subnational governments and the national government.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for labor law is to correct market failures. 71 Such failures include: (1) poor information about workplace hazards, (2) imperfect competition in labor markets, (3) inadequate capital markets which make it hard for workers to obtain education, training, and to relocate, (4) coercion of certain workers, such as children, and (5) an undersupply of quasi-public goods, such as labor-management harmony. Another problem is high unemployment which might be considered a labor market failure in that there is a seller of labor without a buyer. Yet high unemployment also constitutes a government failure. 72 The unemployment may be caused by poor macroeconomic performance, excessive taxes or regulations on employment, or an economy inhospitable to new investment.
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Contrasting autarkic with interdependent economies is helpful for analytical purposes, but there have been few instances in modern experience of autarkic economies. (Macmillan, 1933) , at 65 ('The most vital national economic interest of every country is that its people shall always be efficiently at work.').
A second purpose of labor law is to protect individuals from mistreatment by government officials. The most serious abuses are forced labor, infringement on freedom of association, and discrimination against certain groups like indigenous persons and women. The prohibition of such behavior is often coupled with laws recognizing individual rights to be free from such practices.
Governmental respect for those rights is a precondition for controlling similar abuses by private actors.
A third reason for labor law is to achieve the national conception of justice chosen through democratic processes. Labor markets are known to have inequalities in bargaining power between workers and employers. 73 This asymmetry is not necessarily a market failure -as markets are not established to achieve equity -but it is a social problem for which governments use law to remedy.
For example, national labor law may provide a right to organize a labor union and to bargain collectively. Governments might also mandate a minimum quality of working conditions as a way to achieve income redistribution.
B. Why International Labor Law?
Why In an autarkic economy, each nation would set its own labor law based solely on internal
considerations; yet in an interdependent world economy, foreign conditions will also shape national welfare. 78 Typically, the effects of foreign conditions are transmitted through the market via crossborder trade and investment. Yet there are also some external effects that are transmitted physically. Before discussing the market-oriented factors and other rationales for international labor law, I should note that all of these explanations are state-centric. In other words, they try to explain why a government would seek coordination of labor law with another government, and would select modalities between soft norms and hard rules. Because hard rules restrict national autonomy, there is presumably a logic as to why a government would bind itself into such an arrangement. Yet sometimes, a clear logic may not be evident. 76 See text accompanying supra note 20.
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The proposition that the international economy necessitates international labor rules is often asserted without much explanation. For example, see J.F. Rischard, High Noon (Basic Books, 2002) , at 146 (stating that 'the greater interdependence between countries created by the new world economy makes it more urgent to find a stronger and broader framework for labor rules than has evolved so far'). 78 See Chair's Conclusions, G8 Labor and Employment Ministers Conference, December 2003, para. 4, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca ('Labor market development is shaped by many factors at both the domestic and international levels.'); World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, supra note 69, para. 493 ('Today, countries cannot achieve employment goals on their own.'). In reality, national policy may not be dictated by a rational sovereign. Instead, political processes may be driven by volitions of elites and technocrats, and by pressures from interest groups. (World Bank, 2002) , at 4 (noting that comparative studies reveal little systematic difference in economic performance between countries that provide for freedom of association and the right of collective bargaining, and those that do not); ILO, Report of the Director-General, Organizing for Social Justice, 2004, para. 50 ('A growing body of evidence suggests that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining contribute to improving economic and trade performance and do not have the negative effects predicted by some economic theorists.'), available on ILO website.
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Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford, 2004) , at 130. such a loss of investment could happen. As Brian Langille has observed, the threat of divestment may be much more important in labor relations than is evident in actual investment data.
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Fairness is another motivation for international labor standards. The fairness argument is related to, yet separable from, the efficiency argument that international competition constrains the proper setting of national labor standards. The fairness concern is that countries with high labor standards should not have to compete against countries with low standards. 91 This concern has been voiced against free trade for over 150 years, and despite its incoherence-because unfairness is so subjective 92 -the fairness argument remains prominent today.
The reason why the claim of unfair trade stemming from sweated labor cannot be debunked is that the quest for fairness is a leitmotif of contemporary trade policy. Another problem with the unfairness claim is that Country A may have a valid reason to have a lower labor standard than Country B, and, furthermore, to use its labor standard as a way to compete against B. Deciding when regulatory labor competition is appropriate is a difficult challenge, particularly in a world in which worker exit (or more exactly, immigration) is sharply constrained. 96 An international harmonization of standards may not be better than continued diversity.
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The alleged unfairness of trade on labor grounds has long been used as a reason to block imports. In the 19 th century, the concern was competition against 'pauper labor' or 'cheap labor.' In the 1920s, the term 'social dumping' was applied to trade based on low labor conditions. 98 After
World War II, when governments sought to establish a trading system, there were proposals to link market access to the level of labor standards. As noted above, several Latin American countries sought a labor escape clause, but this effort was resisted by the United States and others. See text accompanying supra note 26. minority of countries were to hold out against doing so, then a country whose interest was injured might be authorized to take steps to protect itself against competition from the holdout countries.
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The Group further suggested that minimum labor standards be defined in an international agreement with reference to ILO conventions in order 'to eliminate international competition based on a country's failure to respect internationally agreed standards, and not to bring about a maximum of uniformity between countries.'
101 No action was taken on this recommendation.
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Although the concern about unfairness has been the principal rationale for a labor/trade link, there is a converse tradition of seeking to use trade liberalization as a way to induce countries to raise labor standards. The first champion was James T. Shotwell who, in 1933, proposed to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull that U.S. tariffs be lowered against countries that were taking action to raise wages and standards of living. 103 Hull rejected the idea. Fifty years later, the idea was revived and made a feature of U.S. trade preference programs. 104 The European Community also has incorporated a labor provision in its tariff preferences for developing countries. The Community makes available more favorable tariff treatment for countries deemed to be complying with the ILO's core labor standards. The labor provisions in contemporary FTAs are derivative of both traditions-the idea of positive incentives and the concern about trade unfairness. Yet the unfairness concerns seem more influential. After all, the cause of action in the U.S.-Chile FTA is lax national enforcement that affects trade between the parties.
106 Inadequate labor law enforcement that lacks an impact on trade would not be actionable.
Another justification for international labor cooperation emphasizes the role of human resources in economic development. 107 Recall the attention to 'human capital' at the Pan American
Conference of 1933. Promoting fuller employment and better working conditions in each country is in the interest of all because national prosperity has positive spillovers. Once best practices toward human resource development and workplace regulation are determined, then governments will benefit from widespread adoption of such practices.
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Note that this rationale may explain why governments cooperate, but does not fully explain why governments would bind themselves in international conventions. One explanation offered by political economists is that a breakdown in the domestic political process may prevent governments from enacting legislation to correct a market failure. 109 An international requirement to do so is therefore politically useful for a government to seek and accept. The Japanese term 'gaiatsu' is sometimes employed to describe this strategic use of foreign pressure for domestic reform. The same idea of an external normative push appeared in the 1956 report by the ILO Group of Experts, which explained that 'If international agreement can be reached that the introduction of certain types of social measures is desirable, this will strengthen the hands of those who, in the various countries, are pressing for the introduction of the measures in question.'
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The last rationale to be discussed is not based on a utilitarian purpose, but rather on the deontological ground that workers are to be respected as individuals. 111 In modern parlance, we capsulize this by saying that labor rights are human rights. 112 Yet one should also remember that labor rights were conceived as a form of international solidarity well before the modern human rights movement.
International law is premised on the dignity of the worker. As Paul O'Higgins has pointed out, the idea that 'Labour is not a commodity' is a fundamental precept of international labor law Guy Caire, 'Labour Standards and International Trade,' in Sengenberger and Campbell, supra note 85, at 297 (discussing the two points of view, namely, the dignity of labor and the economic perspective). 
C. Labor Versus Trade Agreements
Using a labor treaty to achieve common national objectives on labor would seem to be a more straightforward path than using a trade treaty. Certainly, that was the idea in 1919 when the ILO was created, many decades before a comparable international organization was established to promote common trade objectives. Nevertheless, the assumption underlying the longtime efforts to add a social clauses to trade agreements is that the ILO is inadequate to achieving its purpose. Advocates of using the WTO to reinforce the ILO often contend that '...the ILO does not possess the international legal authority to enforce labour standards against recalcitrant states.'
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In the Inter-American context, no thought has been given to the idea of adopting regional labor treaties. The global-regional dynamic in labor policy is different than in trade policy, where it is thought that bilateral and regional agreements can play a useful role in supplementing multilateral agreements. Yet no one is arguing that the alleged inadequacies of the ILO should be remedied by a stronger regional labor agreement.
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Explaining why is a puzzle. The answer that governments are uninterested in regional labor policy is unsatisfying because, if so, then why would they seek to insert labor provisions in a regional trade agreement? It could be that governments lack frameworks for negotiating labor agreements in the same way that they negotiate trade agreements.
118 Or it could be that most governments do not want new international labor disciplines, and can only be induced to accept them through linkage to highly-desired trade agreements. Note that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides some deference to labor market integration agreements. GATS Art. V bis.
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This is certainly so in the United States which has a fast track process for approving trade agreements, but does not have one for approving labor agreements.
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David W. Leebron, 'Linkages,' 96 AJIL 5, at 11-14 (2002) . 120 See Christopher McCrudden and Anne Davies, 'A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights,' in Francesco Francioni (ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (Hart, 2001) , 179, at 187 (suggesting that labor rights that serve to increase freedom of choice and contract are theoretically consistent with the ideology of free trade and may be required by it).
labor standards? These questions are important and deserve careful answers beyond the scope of these lectures.
However persuasive the rationale for including labor in a trade agreement, governments should also weigh the disadvantages of doing so.
121 One possible problem is that seeking labor provisions may discombobulate trade negotiations. Another is that the labor disciplines may lead to trade disputes that will undo trade liberalization. To be sure, these objections also apply to other topics of trade linkage, such as intellectual property rights.
Quite apart from any harm of labor linkage to the trade regime is the potential harm to the labor regime. Those who view the ILO and regional labor cooperation as ineffectual would probably not be concerned about such harm. Yet more thoughtful analysts have recognized the substantial benefits of the ILO, including how it helps governments through norm generation and capacity building. 122 Viewed in this way, the lack of FTA-style enforcement is a virtue of the labor regime rather than a weakness. (Oxford, 2003) , 372, at 392 (positing that bindingness is not the essence of international law); Salazar-Xirinachs and Martínez-Piva, supra note 49, at 332-334.
trade flows, and potentially make it harder for developing countries to expand their exports. 123 Furthermore, both paths are inadequate because they miss opportunities to zero in on a few important trade and labor connections. Part 4 will present my own recommendations for how to incorporate a labor dimension into the FTAA.
Recommendations for the FTAA
A quarter century ago, the ILO annual conference passed a resolution requesting governments to:
see that the trade agreements concluded within the framework of appropriate institutions promote both the expansion of world trade and the local utilisation of the labour force available in various countries and make it possible to achieve a real improvement of the standard of living of the populations in accordance with the objectives of international labour standards in so far as they have been ratified.
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The resolution is noteworthy because it is a rare instance of an ILO pronouncement on trade agreements. The ILO's advice was well-crafted. Disallow prohibitions of unions in export processing zones, and (D) Expand protection for migrant workers. Part 4 presents these recommendations and then concludes the lecture.
A. Enhance the Consumer Role
Although government regulation and subsidies can play an important part in correcting labor market failures, they are not the only tools available. Governments can also facilitate efforts by consumers to seek more socially responsive practices by businesses. The consumer is empowered when he has reliable information about the employment conditions of the workers who produce the products that he buys. Such information can be facilitated by social labels, industry partnerships, and voluntary codes of conduct that are carefully monitored. 126 The worker is helped when her employer follows best practices in labor relations and seeks to invest in its employees.
How should a trade agreement catalyze such changes? Not through heavy-handed rules, but rather by improving regulatory transparency, encouraging national stakeholder dialogues, and using consultative mechanisms at the international level. As noted in Table 1 , the Association Agreement between the EC and Chile provides one example in its provisions on social dialogue. 127 The FTAA could adopt that approach, and could also establish a network of the ongoing labor promotional activities in the NAALC, Mercosur, and other agreements of regional integration.
B. Promote Worker Adjustment
International trade will make a country better off as a whole, and yet some individuals may be left worse off. Therefore, governments should seek to broaden the distribution of the benefits from trade and deliver adjustment assistance to workers who suffer extended dislocations. That government role is sometimes called a 'safety net,' 128 but that term seems too reactive. The aim of an adjustment program should not only be to protect workers from catastrophic impacts, but also to proactively help them find decent work in a changing economy. The instruments available include retraining, relocation allowances, and other employability assistance.
As noted in Part 1, the need for governmental efforts to accord 'economic security' in the perverse, with the Secretariat instructing governments on how to delay trade liberalization by using lengthy transition periods and imposing temporary import protection.
136

C. Disallow Bans on Unions in Export Zones
No one can seriously deny that the issue of worker rights in export processing zones (EPZs) is related to trade, and can be properly addressed within a trade agreement. Nevertheless, no FTA contains standards for how workers are treated in such zones. Yet EPZs in many countries engage in severe abuses of fundamental worker rights.
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Crafting an FTAA rule for EPZs would be a challenge. The ILO lacks any conventions or recommendations on this topic. Surely it is too simplistic to say that EPZs should follow the same labor law that otherwise exists in a country, as that law could be too low to guarantee internationallyrecognized labor rights. On the other hand, prevailing law could be so restrictive that it inhibits investment. For a long time, many countries in Latin America suffered an enervating combination of excessive import protection combined with excessive de jure labor protection, with a consequent loss of investment and employment opportunities.
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My recommendation is that FTAA governments start with one basic rule-that EPZs must not forbid trade unions-and incorporate that into the FTAA. That rule would require some elaboration, of course, but governments should not try to import everything from the authoritative ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining. Any complaint raised would need to be premised on the FTAA rule, even against governments that are party to core ILO conventions. See Roger Plant, Labour Standards and Structural Adjustment (ILO, 1994) , at 85-90 (discussing the Latin American experience with inflexible labor markets).
The complaint procedure I envision is victim-to-state, not state-to-state. The rationale for a victim-to-state mechanism is that it depoliticizes the dispute system so that no government is saddled with having to espouse the claims of its citizens. Perhaps one reason why no NAFTA labor case was ever filed is that the target government might consider that an unfriendly act.
The complaint process would be similar to the investor-state arbitration in NAFTA except that an individual would also be able to lodge a complaint about the actions of its own government, rather than only a foreign government. Criteria would be needed to establish eligibility to lodge a complaint, and I favor a flexible procedure that permits complaints from individual victims, unions, and public interest groups. A valid complaint about an EPZ would lead to the appointment of an independent panel similar to the panels available for FTA commercial disputes. The worker would not have a right of action against the employer. Cases of that sort would need to remain in national tribunals. Even so, a screening mechanism should be set up to protect a company's reputation from being injured by frivolous complaints.
If the panel rules against the defendant government, the government would be given time to correct the violation, but if no correction ensues, the scofflaw government should be required to pay a fine until the matter is corrected. The fine would be paid to the independent FTAA commission, which could use the money for its regular programs.
Because the EPZ mechanism suggested here differs so much from the labor mechanism provided for in the CAFTA, it may be useful to summarize those differences. My proposal is based on an international rule (to be formulated in the FTAA), while CAFTA is based on each country's own domestic law. 139 My proposal provides for a private right of action, while CAFTA is state-tostate. 140 My proposal allows an individual to secure an independent panel, while in CAFTA, an 139 See CAFTA, supra note 57, Art. 16.2(1)(a). 140 See id., Art. 20.6.
individual submits a communication to an office in its country. 141 My proposal provides for a financial sanction in the event of non-compliance, while in CAFTA, the scofflaw government pays a monetary assessment to the CAFTA commission, with that money being used for labor initiatives in the defendant country. 142 My proposal is probably too bold to get enacted, but it would be an interesting experiment that could fructify a right to form and join a free trade union in EPZs.
D. Expand Protection for Migrant Workers
Although FTAs seek to liberalize the movement of goods, services, and capital, they have tended to given little attention to the movement of people. Yet worker mobility is logically a part of economic integration, and, like importing and exporting, can benefit both the sending and receiving countries. 143 This principle is recognized with regard to temporary entry for business executives and professionals, and the same need also exists for less-skilled workers.
The issue of labor mobility has been addressed in some Inter-American trade agreements.
Most notably, the Caribbean Community provides for the free movement of university graduates and those in listed occupations. 144 The NAFTA contains a chapter on Temporary Entry for Business Persons, as do the U.S. and Canada FTAs with Chile. 145 But the CAFTA does not because, in 2003, the U.S. government got queasy from making immigration commitments in trade agreements. 146 For the United States, it seems that very little has changed since 1928 when it told the Pan American conference that the control of immigration 'is a matter of purely domestic concern....' 147 The ongoing FTAA talks have neglected even to set up a negotiating group for temporary entry.
If freer immigration cannot be achieved within the FTAA, then governments might instead try to negotiate provisions for greater protection of migrant workers. Relevant international norms already exist, 148 and key guarantees could be incorporated into the FTAA in the same manner that guarantees from intellectual property treaties will probably be incorporated. Establishing rules for the benefit of migrant workers in the FTAA would help individuals who are commonly exploited.
Such rules would have synergies with ongoing regional cooperation on migration policy.
149
E. Summary and Overall Conclusion
The ideas in Part 4 seek to stimulate practical, concerted action to address labor and employment problems of regional economic integration. My recommendations for the FTAA do not include an obligation to adhere to core ILO conventions. However one weighs the advantages and disadvantages of that course, such fusion is unlikely to be accepted by FTAA governments. As for the reciprocal obligation to enforce national law, it should be omitted unless governments are willing to replace the current window dressing with a private right of action. (Asser Press, 2003) . Some of the key norms are protection against discrimination, access to health care, and a right to depart and reenter. 
